Push review · a980c31
Load Stripe key from environment
GitHub check
All clear
No verified vulnerabilities and code craft 270/300.
Points
+350ptsTotal270620
Security0350
Craft270270
What changed: Moves the Stripe secret to configuration. Note: the leaked key still needs rotation in the Stripe dashboard.Scripted demo replay
Security agent
Scripted demo replay
Instead of reading one big prompt, the agent plans, then investigates the code graph one tool call at a time and sees each real result before deciding what to check next.
Plan
- 1Inspect the changed function and where its inputs come from
- 2Trace entry points through the change to dangerous calls
- 3Read the code on the path for validation or auth checks
- 4Report only what the evidence supports
- Step 1Looked up
app.services.billing:BillingService.chargeStart with the changed symbol.
What it found
{ "id": "app.services.billing:BillingService.charge", "kind": "method", "file": "app/services/billing.py", "lines": [ 32, 39 ], "params": [ "self", "customer_id", "amount_cents" ], "entry_point": false, "route": null, "depends_on": [], "untrusted_inputs": [], "dangerous_calls": [ { "kind": "network", "call": "httpx.post", "line": 34, "reached_by_untrusted_data": true } ], "has_docstring": true } callers: (none) callees: (none)