Push review · 2dbb29d
Restrict webhook test deliveries to https public hosts
GitHub check
All clear
No verified vulnerabilities and code craft 290/300.
Points
+105ptsTotal677782
Security560607
Craft117175
What changed: Adds an https + public-address allow-list before outbound webhook delivery and disables redirects, closing the SSRF from day 5.Scripted demo replay
Security agent
Scripted demo replay
Instead of reading one big prompt, the agent plans, then investigates the code graph one tool call at a time and sees each real result before deciding what to check next.
Plan
- 1Inspect the changed function and where its inputs come from
- 2Trace entry points through the change to dangerous calls
- 3Read the code on the path for validation or auth checks
- 4Report only what the evidence supports
- Step 1Looked up
app.services.notifications:is_public_httpsStart with the changed symbol.
What it found
{ "id": "app.services.notifications:is_public_https", "kind": "function", "file": "app/services/notifications.py", "lines": [ 17, 24 ], "params": [ "url" ], "entry_point": false, "route": null, "depends_on": [], "untrusted_inputs": [], "dangerous_calls": [], "has_docstring": true } callers: app.services.notifications:deliver (app/services/notifications.py:27-33) [sinks=network@L31(tainted)] via line 29 [tainted args] callees: (none)